DNS TTL Values as Potent Allies of DDoS Attackers:

A Fact Overlooked by Some Major US and EU Banks

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


DNS - Introduction

Domain Name System (DNS) – [distributed database + application layer protocol] that are essential to functioning of Internet

- \succ performs 'symbolic name \leftrightarrow IP address' translation
- Distributed DNS Database implemented as a hierarchy of many DNS servers
- DNS Protocol allows querying of DNS servers by other DNS servers and regular (end) hosts
 - runs over UDP (or TCP), with servers on port 53
 - generally not accessed directly by end users DNS resolution takes place transparently in application programs such as web browsers, email tools







Authoritative DNS Servers – organization's DNS servers, provide hostname to IP mappings for all organization's <u>publicly accessible hosts</u>

Local DNS Servers – <u>do NOT belong to</u> <u>hierarchy, yet crucial to DNS architecture</u>. Each ISP, company, university, ... has one. Local DNS servers receive queries from hosts and (possibly) forward them into DNS.

DNS System – Operation (1)



DNS System – Operation (2)





DNS System - Caching

Goals of DNS Caching – reduce the load on high-level DNS name servers and resolve queries more efficiently


- Performed by clients and lower-level DNS servers
- Time-to-Live (TTL) Time determines how long a DNS Record remains in a DNS Cache
 - ✓ DNS requests likely served directly from clients' Caches ⇒ faster webpage download
 - ✓ fewer requests forwarded to higherlevel DNS servers
 - infrequent Cache updates may cause problems in case of host failure followed by IP address migration



DDoS - Introduction

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) – concentrated effort to saturate the victim machine (web-server) with a large volume of traffic and/or processing

- > server unable to provide service to regular users
- executed by a botnet collection of compromised computers (bots) controlled by bot-master



DDoS – Long & Short Term Goals

DDoS Short-Term Goals – 'cut off' the server from as many <u>regular</u> users as possible

DDoS Long-Term Goals – tarnish victim's reputation and cause major financial loss

| Session | The User and Business Impact of Server Delays, Additional Bytes, and |
|------------|--|
| | HTTP Chunking in Web Search |
| Presenters | Eric Schurman (Microsoft), Jake Brutlag (Google) |

A report released by Forrester Consulting today, "The Impact of Poor Web Site Performance in Financial Services," finds that, unsurprisingly, bank customers' expectations for website performance are high, with 75% of online financial services consumers expecting 99% or higher web site availability. The findings of the study, which was sponsored by Akamai, also indicate that website performance is second only to security in user expectations; 36% of consumers who bank online and 42% of consumers who trade online consider 100% availability important.

More than half of online banking users (56%) expect web pages to load in two seconds or less, which is significantly more than the 47% of consumers who just shop online. Website performance ranks above even functions like single sign-on or ease of use. The study also found that 64% of online banking and brokerage customers have had dissatisfying experiences online.

POOP)HTTP%20Chunking%20in%20Web%20Search%20Presentation.pptx

ated populations changed one variable and measured


lay: 1 second slowdown = 2.8% revenue loss; 2 second ie loss.

on user satisfaction persists long after delays removed

DDoS - Defences

Places of DDoS Defence Implementation – almost exclusively at/near (victim) network

- Edge Router perform filtering of blacklisted IP addresses
- Firewall allow 'in' only trusted traffic/protocols + perform protocol inspection
- Load Balancer distribute web-server (symbolic name) over multiple IP addresses
- Geographically Distributed Web-Server Replicas servers do not share the common access path






DDoS - Defences (cont.)

Example of Geographically Distributed Web Server Replicas: Content Distribution Networks (CDN)


➢ not a practical/feasible solution for some networks ...





DDoS – Defences (cont.)


Common Problem of DDoS Defence



User/client experience is the ultimate concern of DDoS defence \Rightarrow parameters controlled by server/victim site must be appropriately chosen.

DDoS and DNS TTLs

Client DNS-Cache Lock – user accessing a web-site/server before a DDoS attack, followed by server migration to a new location, are 'locked' by initially obtained DNS Record for up to TTL t.u.



- likely actions by average user to resolve the lock:
 - \rightarrow try reloading the page
 - \rightarrow try closing & opening browser
 - \rightarrow try opening new browser
- none of the above will affect DNS cache (help obtain new record)
- solution in command console type: >ipconfig /flushdns




Empirical Study

DNS Records of 45 Major US and EU Banks

Group I: 15 best performing US banks according to Forbes.com

- 9 banks use DNSTTL > 60 min
- all banks advertise one single 'symbolic-name' to IP' mapping - no provisions for web-server redundancy




Financial

Empirical Study (cont.)

Group 2: 15 largest US banks (asset-value) according to Forbes.com

- 3 banks use DNSTTL > 60 min
- 9 banks use DNSTTL < 1 min</p>
- > 2 banks use multiple 'symbolic-name to IP' mappings




DNSTTL times in min

Empirical Study (cont.)

Group 3: 15 largest EU banks according to BanksDaily.com

- 3 banks use DNSTTL > 60 min
- 4 banks use DNS TTL = 0 min
- > 2 banks use multiple 'symbolic-name to IP' mappings
- I bank use services of Akamai CDN



BBVA, Spain

DNSTTL times in min